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Whose justice?
Contextualising Angola’s 
reintegration process
Inge Ruigrok*
Over the past decade, international efforts to end protracted confl ict in Africa have directed large 
streams of funds towards the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants in 
rural areas. While designed as an integrated approach, the emphasis tends to lie on short time frames 
of transition through centrally managed programmes that narrowly target ‘the demobilised’. Despite 
the good intentions of these programmes, there are a number of questions that need to be answered, 
particularly how the benefi ciaries perceive them. This essay tries to answer some of these questions 
by analysing Caluquembe, a district in central Angola where villagers were subjected to violence on 
an everyday basis, and where since the war ended in 2002 hundreds of former UNITA soldiers 
and their families were reintegrated. The essay argues that the ongoing ‘normalisation’ efforts of 
reintegrating displaced people and demobilised soldiers are facing a number of challenges due to the 
narrow targeting of benefi ts, the lack of involvement of local government, the absence of any form of 
national reconciliation, and the emphasis on economic reintegration in an environment of extreme 
poverty and social exclusion. The essay also draws a number of lessons that could benefi t reintegration 
efforts in the Great Lakes Region, particularly for the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi.
* Inge Ruigrok is a freelance journalist based in Portugal and a PhD candidate in the 
Research School for Resource Studies for Development (CERES) at the Free University 
Amsterdam in the Netherlands.
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Introduction: Angola’s reconciliation process
Angola presents a quite unique and challenging context for a reintegration process, as 
the country lived through such a long episode in which there were two relatively clearly 
defi ned social and political structures, supported by rival ideologies. Both sides have 
built their internal mobilisation and support through the formation of an exclusive 
political, even national identity, while claiming to be the voice of the more authentic 
Angola. At the same time, the political and military divisions were both blurred and 
fl uent during the sequences of war since independence from Portugal in 1975, and 
often even crossed families. It is now a common belief in broader Angolan society that 
reconciliation is foremost a process that takes place on a micro-level, with help from the 
churches, expressed often as somos todos irmãos, ‘we are all brothers’. 
Another factor that complicates Angola’s post-war transition is the very nature of this 
process. The end of war was abrupt and for most, unexpected. While images of the 
trophy– a lifeless Jonas Savimbi lying on the grass in his underpants – were broadcast 
all over the world, President José Eduardo dos Santos fl ew to Lisbon to discuss the new 
situation with the Portuguese government, and then to the United States to meet with 
President George W Bush and Ibrahim Gambari, the UN Under-Secretary for African 
Affairs. Back in Luanda, on 13 March 2002, President dos Santos announced a peace 
plan that instructed the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) to stop all offensive actions 
against UNITA (União Nacional pela Independência Total de Angola) rebels.1 From then 
on, events followed one another in quick succession. On 4 April 2002, a new peace 
agreement was signed in which both sides promised to complete the implementation of 
the Lusaka Protocol.
In fact, the political transition occurred without the MPLA (Movimento Popular de 
Libertação de Angola) conceding any power. The government’s conviction has always been, 
especially in the last phase of war, that it was protecting the Angolan people and that its 
military campaign was a defence of democracy and sovereignty, a war that had to be 
waged for peace. It made a great effort to portray Angola as a ‘normal’ country, above all 
through the restart of the constitutional drafting process.2 It is for these reasons that the 
government never felt the need to apologise for any wrongdoings, contrary to UNITA, 
whose secretary for political issues, Abílio Kamalata Numa, appeared on Rádio Nacional 
on 6 January 2003 to ask for forgiveness from Angolans who were directly or indirectly 
affected by UNITA’s mistakes.
Angola’s 27 years of war has produced winners and losers, although the government 
has refrained itself from displaying a victorious mood and adopted a forgiving attitude, 
pre-empting prosecution and punishment for all. Reconciliation has practically been 
synonymous to a blanket amnesty for crimes committed in the context of war; such laws 
were continuously updated to include the next phase of confl ict. An amnesty clause was 
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part of the 2002 Luena Memorandum of Understanding, which reiterated the ‘national 
reconciliation’ as called for in the Lusaka Protocol.3 At the same time, reconciliation 
concerned the broadening of Angola’s political structures on national and sub-national 
level to include UNITA, and more recently, with the end of confl ict in the province 
Cabinda, Fórum Cabindes para o Dialogo (FCD), and to establish a joint national army and 
police force.
In the shadow of these arrangements between elites, ordinary Angolans were told to 
forget the past and look forward to the future. Such an effort to move on is not without 
danger as injuries are not so much forgiven but publicly ignored, leaving them to fester. 
The risk is that collective memory becomes a political tool, as the alternation of forgetting 
and remembering itself etches the path of power (Minow 1998:119). Yet, the complexity 
of the wounds have even made civil society activists believe that an institutionalised 
response to human rights abuses (which included a ‘scorch earth’ policy pursued by 
the FAA to wrench guerrillas from their support base while the increasingly isolated 
UNITA forces engaged in savage responses) would not be a favourable option in Angola 
today. The discourse is much about the necessity of having a ‘social peace’, a settlement 
that goes beyond a military agreement to include ‘transparent political competition’. ‘It 
is more important that people are lifted out of poverty, and have access to opportunities. 
Maybe, much later, through a national debate, we can look at the political side to try to 
understand the lessons that caused the confl ict to last for so long. Not at this moment.’4
In actual fact, Angola’s most inclusive national reconciliation initiative so far is the 
government’s reintegration programme, which it drew up as war ended in 2002 
after which it was made to fi t the framework of the World Bank’s Multi-Country 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP). The policy represents the 
inauguration of a nation-building process in which the Angolan state has increasingly 
positioned itself as the harbinger of post-war reconstruction. Today, President dos Santos 
– portrayed as Angola’s ‘peace-president’ – openly admits that only one million people 
in Angola have the basic conditions for living, a public acknowledgment that would have 
been unthinkable a few years ago. Reintegration, with its emphasis on the fi ght against 
poverty and the diminution of political and economic disparities, aims to advance 
redistributive justice. Improving the benefi ts and opportunities offered to the military 
demobilised from active service became a main focus. Priority is placed in the rural 
areas that were most affected by war, and the re-launching of agricultural production. 
For the society in general, the programme stimulates the acceptance of a ‘new way of 
conducting social relationships.’
This essay explores one aspect of this reintegration process, namely its local legitimacy. 
How do those affected perceive the trans-nationally designed policies that seek to 
reconcile their local society? And how do these policies fi t with the way people re-
imagine peace, in their homes and in their daily lives? Such questions matter because a 
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durable and integrated justice process can lead to greater legitimacy and thus to a greater 
chance of delivering enduring peace. On the other hand, a reintegration process linked 
to national reconciliation always runs the risk of a trade-off between security and justice. 
Addressing these issues calls for a bottom-up and contextualised perspective. The fi rst 
part of this essay situates Angola’s reintegration programme with its redistributive justice 
features within a wider political framework. The second part brings the perspective of 
the people of Caluquembe, just one district in the interior of Angola where the outcome 
of the reintegration process will be determined. The essay concludes with some lessons 
drawn from the Angolan case for the region.
Reintegration and its political context
The inter-linkages between confl icts in central Africa inspired the World Bank in 
April 2002 to design a regional approach to channel international donor support to 
demobilisation and reintegration activities in the region. Under the umbrella guidelines 
of the MDRP, individual country plans are conceived in conjunction with national 
governments. Qualifying for support are African countries that participate in the regional 
peace process for the Great Lakes Region, and that established domestically ‘appropriate 
institutional arrangements’ for a national MDRP. The programme aims at enhancing the 
prospects for stabilisation and recovery in the region. Disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration of ex-combatants are necessary to establishing peace and restoring security; 
the programme philosophises, which are in turn pre-conditions for sustainable growth 
and poverty reduction. In this process, the World Bank’s role is threefold: the international 
fi nancial institute acts as manager of the MDRP Secretariat, as administrator of the 
Multi-Donor Trust Fund and as co-fi nancier of national programmes.5
The Angolan government, a signatory to the Lusaka agreement that formally ended 
confl ict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), commenced a series of talks 
with the World Bank on a possible Angolan version of the MDRP in May 2002. By that 
time, it was already clear that such a programme would only relate to the reintegration 
of former combatants in local society, and not to the process of disarmament and 
demobilisation. To avoid any repetition of the fl awed processes of the past, the 
government had prioritised the demobilisation of 97 138 UNITA combatants, of which 
5 007 would stay in the FAA, while 40 would be integrated into the national police. 
It was effectively managing this stage single-handedly, although it had postponed the 
security reforms that included the discharge of 33 000 FAA troops.6 Disjointedly from 
the demobilisation process, which was managed by the Joint Military Commission 
in which both MPLA and UNITA were represented, a comprehensive reintegration 
program for the demobilised UNITA combatants was put on paper. This policy 
fl eshed out the agreements made between the former belligerent parties in the Luena 
Memorandum of Understanding and for which the government sought donor funding 
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to share the estimated costs of US$55 million.7 The Institute for Socio-Economic 
Reintegration of Ex-Military (IRSEM), an agency within the Ministry of Assistance 
and Social Reinsertion (MINARS), would be in charge of implementation, while a 
special inter-ministerial commission would keep an eye on policy development and 
carry political responsibility.
The World Bank recommended a revision of the government’s plans, which would 
integrate the demobilisation and the reintegration process into one national programme. 
Such a strategy could then be broadened to include not just the UNITA combatants 
demobilised under the Memorandum of Understanding, but also 33 000 FAA troops 
that were to be demobilised, and ‘old case-loads’. This last category included 191 400 
combatants identifi ed for demobilisation and reintegration under the two former peace 
processes, but that were abandoned in mid-stream as donors withdrew funds in the 
wake of renewed war, having received none or only part of the assistance to which they 
were entitled.8 For the ‘new case-loads’, the World Bank envisaged a ‘transitional safety 
net’: a cash allowance that would cover the basic needs of the ex-combatants for a period 
of twelve months. 
Importantly, the assistance to the reintegration of ex-military should be made benefi cial 
to the wider community and consistent with the support to over four million returning 
civilians and to broader recovery efforts at the local level. A social component would 
form part of the reintegration programme, with projects focused on reconciliation. 
Although the government had also clearly envisaged this in its own reintegration 
programme, the World Bank rationalised that a single centralised government agency 
would manage the combined reintegration efforts better. A presidential decree created a 
national commission, Comissão Nacional de Reintegração Social e Productiva dos Desmobilizados 
e Deslocados (CNRSPDD), in early June 2002,9 which substitutes the inter-ministerial 
commission. IRSEM continues as the implementing agency, while responding to the 
Executive Committee of CNRSPDD, which is headed by the minister of Assistance and 
Social Reinsertion (MINARS).
The integrated approach that the MDRP demanded was built into the second draft 
policy, Programa Geral de Desmoblização e Reintegração (PGDR), which the Angolan 
government presented on 10 October 2002. This was a three-year programme, starting 
from the demobilisation phase in April 2002, although the government fi nanced this 
component on its own account, which at the time already exceeded US$100 million. But 
the fi nal negotiations between the World Bank and the Angolan government planned 
for November 2002 were delayed to the end of January 2003. Outstanding issues had 
to be resolved in the exact design of the PGDR, which the World Bank and its donors 
called the Angolan Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (ADRP). These were 
concluded in late March 2003 after which the World Bank gave its green light to an IDA 
credit of US$33 million. 
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The amount still needed for the reintegration programme, whose costs was calculated 
at US$179,7 million, was a US$48,4 million grant from the MDRP Trust Fund and 
US$16,6 million bilateral donor funding, in addition to further government contribution 
(World Bank 2003c). Yet, there were concerns among donors regarding the pace and 
nature of the government’s demobilisation efforts. Military IDs, for instance, were not 
always distributed prior to discharge from quartering areas, and there were indications 
that some former UNITA troops were taken to places for resettlement against their 
will. Donors who supported the MDRP Trust Fund felt that IRSEM was not prepared 
enough to implement such a wide-ranging and complex reintegration programme, and 
even if it was, the amount of opportunities that could be offered to the demobilised 
soldiers in their areas of return was still too little (World Bank 2002). 
In general there were teething troubles regarding donor involvement in Angola’s post-
war rebuilding efforts. For the World Bank, the ADRP forms part of a larger package, 
labelled the Post-Confl ict Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme (PCRRP), 
which broadly aims at achieving macro-economic stability, and the implementation of 
a ‘pro-poor post-confl ict spending program increasingly focused on service delivery’ 
(World Bank 2003a). If a country is to qualify for donor funding, such a general recovery 
programme must be based on a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, of which the Angolan 
government only presented a draft version in September 2003, without the required 
three-years macro-economic framework (Ministério do Planeamento 2003). Also, an 
agreement on an IMF-supported programme is necessary. As Angola is considered to be 
a ‘high-risk high-reward’ country, with oil reserves that are not just providing astonishing 
business opportunities, but also severe development concerns, the conditions attached 
to the donor aid were even tougher. The government had to pick up the pace with 
fi nalising an oil sector diagnostic study, and reduce ‘its extra-budgetary and quasi-fi scal 
outlays’. Furthermore, support to the ADRP would be linked to increased transparency 
regarding public fi nancial management, the government’s plans for the security sector, a 
reduction in the size of the FAA, and a substantial government contribution to fi nancing 
the ADRP.
On durability: Reintegration policy in practice 
Despite the overall objective to help consolidate socio-economic stability in Angola, 
and in the Great Lakes Region in general, the World Bank defi ned its intervention as a 
short-term measure, intended to give a fi rst push to recovery. Accordingly, the ADRP, 
which fi nally came off the ground in March 2004, consists of an array of sub-projects, 
all limited in time. Each sub-project offers ‘opportunities’ to a group of ex-combatants 
in the area where they returned to, based on their wishes and skills, and on what the 
local economy has to offer. Agriculture is identifi ed as a key possibility for the career-
changing soldiers, also because the government hopes to re-launch this sector that once 
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produced the fi nest coffee in the world, and develop rural areas that were so affected 
by war. But demobilised soldiers may also choose to start small businesses, or receive 
on-the-job training while they are involved in community building projects. If an ex-
combatant qualifi es, he or she may receive additional ‘complementary opportunities’ 
such as micro-credit and job placement in a public or private institution.
The implementation of the ADRP is based on a two-tire strategy. IRSEM, which has 
offi ces in each of the country’s 18 provinces, forms the centre of the institutional web. 
As the implementation arm of CNRSPDD, it is in direct contact with the World Bank, 
although the money fl ow goes via an independent fi nancial management unit. IRSEM 
also prepares inventories of the different reintegration projects, the majority of which it 
contracts out to larger implementing partners who either developed specifi c activities 
themselves or established partnerships with smaller organisations that work at grassroots 
level. These ‘primary partners’ are usually international NGOs such as CARE, or UN 
agencies that supplement IRSEM’s management capacities while providing technical 
knowledge and capacity building to the smaller service providers. 
This is the programme design on paper. In practice, the time span for reintegration sub-
projects proved to be too short, exhausting the smaller organisations that are actually 
implementing the ADRP at the local level, rather than strengthening them. As the 
coordinator of one organisation voiced:
[A]n agricultural project can’t be implemented in 9 months, there is not 
enough result by then. There is this bureaucratic network. The payment 
for the project comes in three phases. Each time, we have to submit a 
progress report to IRSEM in the province and they send it to IRSEM at 
national level and fi nally to the World Bank. It takes two months to analyse 
it, and in the meantime, the next phase is blocked. Formally, the project 
has already fi nished but we have only received 50 percent of the budget. 
We are now trying to overcome this situation. The process was diffi cult in 
the beginning. We had to think about how to engage with ex-military that 
had fought on the side of the rebels. We were fearful. But once we began it 
went well, and now we are worried that we have to leave in the middle. We 
would like to give support until there is minimum stability, so we can look 
back and say that it was worth the effort.10
Originally, the ADRP would start before June 2003. The implementation was postponed 
to March 2004, and then it still took close to a year before the fi rst sub-projects were 
up and running as IRSEM’s partners had to be selected, and their proposals reviewed. 
By the end of 2004, only 7 288 demobilised UNITA soldiers were benefi ting from 
projects under the ADRP (IRSEM 2005), while the fi rst thousands had already returned 
to their areas of origin or choice two years earlier. Smaller reintegration projects fi lled 
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the gap in the meantime. The MDRP Trust Fund allocated about US$4,3 million to 
an UNDP-led pilot project in central Angola that targeted 4 891 demobilised UNITA 
troops, although only 3 117 of these were recent ex-combatants, the assistance mostly 
concerned short-term training instead of sustainable employment opportunities. When 
the project ended in June 2005, close to 45 000 ex-combatants had received agricultural 
assistance through FAO, although the planned 50 000 agricultural toolkits had hardly 
been distributed. Also, the government had started its own reintegration initiatives by 
offering 6 500 ex-combatants jobs at the ministries of Health and Education, while a 
further 4 448 had received professional training under a programme run by the Ministry 
of Public Administration, Employment, and Social Security. Approximately 8 000 
demobilised soldiers had by early 2004 already found employment at other public or 
private institutions, without any support, or with fi nancial assistance from sources other 
than the MDRP (World Bank 2005).
In the rural areas, where most ex-combatants returned to, there often was a dazzling 
variety of reintegration schemes, set up for the time being by local church groups or 
NGOs. These projects could only carter to a handful of demobilised soldiers, and offered 
limited assistance and few benefi ts. When the much larger national programme was fi nally 
formalised, in many cases all demobilised soldiers came to register. Yet, the ADRP not 
only disqualifi es the ‘old-case loads’, ex-combatants who were demobilised in the context 
of the two previous peace processes. Also, soldiers that had recently been demobilised, 
but had already benefi ted from any other reintegration project, were excluded from the 
opportunities offered under the ADRP even if they did not feel reintegrated enough yet. 
This resulted in a substantial degree of confusion and misunderstanding. 
When the time span of transnationally designed programmes is short, there is a high 
possibility that they would have few benefi ts due to their limited involvement of local 
state institutions. Working with state institutions is often a drawn out, tedious and 
highly political process. International donors often prefer to quickly put up their own 
camps instead of working with local authorities. Such an approach may also jeopardise 
the durability of the assistance, as well as other processes such as transitional justice. 
In Angola, where the general reconciliation process has taken such a strong development 
angle in the absence of any legal or quasi-legal response to human rights abuses, the 
coordinating and monitoring task of authorities that are closest to citizens seems to 
be particularly important. The ADRP broadly recognises that the process ‘should be 
implemented in close coordination with local and provincial administrations to ensure 
that all activities targeted at ex-combatants remained consistent with overall integration 
activities at local level’ (World Bank 2003, paragraphs 21, 91 and 92). 
Yet, in practice, the programme seems to rely entirely on central government agencies 
with decentralised directorates in the provinces, and on NGOs as implementing 
Essays 91
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [V
rije
 U
niv
ers
ite
it A
ms
ter
da
m]
 at
 02
:58
 26
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
2 
92 African Security Review 16.1     Institute for Security Studies
partners. The CNRSPDD has branches outside Luanda that are responsible for 
resettlement and reintegration, but these are limited to the provincial level and meet 
on an ad hoc basis. Generally, the ADRP follows the contours of contemporary state 
administration in Angola, which remains highly centralised, with vertical accountability 
relations, despite the adoption of a law that realised a partial devolution of the country’s 
political-administrative affairs from Luanda to sub-national governments.11 These state 
reforms have not yet percolated to the lower levels in a signifi cant way. For instance, 
most of the ministerial responsibilities have not been delegated to the municipalities.12 
Aggravating this situation are the blank spots in state administration at the level of bairros 
and povoações. These lowest administrative units still have no legal framework, leaving a 
great part of the population, particularly in rural areas, at the outer edges of the state.
People’s perceptions: The case of Caluquembe
An obvious, yet not frequently asked question that comes to mind when studying 
transitional justice processes, designed on a transnational scale, is what legitimacy these 
programmes have in the eyes of those affected. People’s reactions to such initiatives 
are often manifestly diverse. They depend primarily on what type of justice that is 
administered, and how it is administered, as well as on the background of the people, and 
their experiences over time. These experiences do not only include people’s encounters 
with direct violence, and confl ict resolution settlements, but also the large-scale process 
of mobilisation of materials and social resources societies at war usually undergo, and 
the opportunities and capabilities people have themselves to heal the wounds of war and 
rebuild their lives and their societies. 
It is this question that is central to the following case study of Caluquembe, a district 190 
km northeast of Lubango in south-central Angola, although an extensive examination 
goes beyond the scope of this essay.13 Caluquembe, as the breadbasket of Huíla province, 
was a hotly contested area in Angola’s last two war episodes. Although there were 
incidents of fi ghting on its outskirts all along, particularly in 1987, the district was drawn 
into a situation of full-scale war when UNITA occupied the area in March 1991 and 
attempted to install its own administrative structures there. Initially, the rebel movement 
enjoyed sizeable support from the population. This changed with the violent run-up to 
the elections of 1992, a fi rst exercise in democracy that is engraved in people’s minds as 
a traumatic event. Even when the government recaptured Caluquembe in October 1994, 
the district remained surrounded, turning into a patchwork of government and rebel-
held areas. The population that did not fl ee to safer grounds remained trapped, largely 
out of reach for humanitarian agencies, until war ended in 2002.
Today, Caluquembe is one of Angola’s former war zones where UNITA and MPLA are 
sharing power in the municipal administration offi ce, while the district’s population has 
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returned to rural life with its lush green hills. Peace brought many changes to Caluquembe. 
Often cited is that a free movement of people is again possible, that ‘the war does not let us 
lose our children any longer’, and that the risk of losing land and animals has disappeared.14 
‘I am not a deslocado any more. Having to leave was the most diffi cult thing that happened 
in my life. It is very sad. A person loses everything, also respect. To live on the land of 
others is diffi cult.’15 Deslocado (‘displaced’) identity among people who had to fl ee war refers 
to loss of land and home; it is an empty identity. ‘A deslocado is not respected. It is someone 
who lost everything. That hurts a lot, principally when you know that you still have the 
strength to work. I don’t want to remember that I was once called like that.’16
Simultaneously with the returning villagers, 1 074 soldiers that were demobilised under the 
Memorandum of Understanding settled in Caluquembe. Most, if not all, were born there, 
and rejoined their families. For some, fi ghting for UNITA was a question of survival. Not 
just because it provided a job and an income, or they believed that life would become better 
once UNITA was in power, but also because they had become party members and feared 
for their life when war restarted in 1992.17 Others were abducted as children and forced to 
fi ght in UNITA’s army. ‘In 1984, I was taken together with my grandfathers with whom I 
lived to Chicomba, which was under UNITA’s control from then on. Even though I was 
only 17, I was installed in FALA. Politicians who wanted power against all costs used us.’18 
Interestingly, although they were taken by UNITA against their will, as children, they 
stayed in military life for a very long time, sometimes up to 20 years. All interviewed ex-
soldiers stayed for more than ten years, having never been demobilised in the context of 
previous peace processes. ‘In 1994, there were troops that had to stay to reinforce the party 
structures. These ones did not go to the quartering areas. There was a fear that they would 
desert if they would be taken to the FAA. These soldiers were selected beforehand.’19
Politics is a topic that still causes great fear. The experience of having fought on the side of 
the ‘losers’ and being reintegrated into a local society that suffered vicious UNITA attacks, 
has silenced many people. The fi rst days at home were diffi cult. In some areas, people think 
that only UNITA killed and the other side did not. They clearly remember, while they 
were living in a government-controlled area, when UNITA attacked and took their fathers, 
brothers, their animals and burned their homes. These acts left indelible marks in families: 
I think the worst situation has already passed. But these fi rst days, when we 
really got there, the situation was not good at all. People react and say: ‘The 
ones that have reached my age know very well that my father died, and the 
oxen went, and who did all this? It was an individual of UNITA.’ But now 
the situation is improving, little by little.20
Both demobilised soldiers as returning villagers say that they hoped to return to their 
land, to return to cultivating, to fi nd back their family. Family relations seem to have 
been the most important reintegration ‘mechanism’. 
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In the last years, I didn’t agree anymore with the war. All I wanted was to 
return to my land and start a new life. After the war, I decided to install me 
here in Ngola, because I knew that in the place where you were born you 
are always welcomed. Until now, nothing bad happened. I found my family 
again via the party bureau of UNITA, and because I had always a good 
relationship with them, the reintegration was easy. The life we are having 
now is very different from military life. With more time, I think we will be 
able to say that this life is better.21
Caluquembe’s 1 074 ex-combatants are a target group for the ADRP, although only 
800 qualifi ed for the reintegration support that started in January 2006, including 7 
women and 19 disabled. Others had already benefi ted from the carpenter’s project the 
local Catholic Church had set up for ten months with funds from the government, in 
which their wives learnt how to cook and clean. Also an Italian NGO had started a 
small initiative, and the government had distributed some cattle, in the hope that the ex-
combatants would form a cooperative.
Within the ADRP, most of the demobilised forces work as farmers. Five ex-combatants 
were given one male and two female goats for breeding, and two oxen they have to share. 
Additionally, they received basic agricultural equipment and seeds to start growing crops. 
A group of 35 opted for on-the-job training while building a school for the community, 
which earned them a salary of US$50 for six months. Twenty ex-combatants started 
their own businesses, such as a pharmacy, a furniture workshop, etc. They borrowed 
US$300 out of a rotating fund without paying interest. In six months, they made a 
profi t, and refunded the start-up capital. The ADRP in Caluquembe ended in September 
2006. By that time, 622 out of 800 qualifying demobilised soldiers had received support. 
Nationally, just over half of all demobilised UNITA combatants were by then covered 
under the programme. IRSEM had signed contracts with the implementing partners 
for the reintegration of 53 387 ex-combatants, of which 52 974 were benefi ting from 
assistance.22 The ADRP was supposed to fi nish by the end of 2006, but the programme 
has been prolonged for an indefi nite period.
Security concerns represented by the former UNITA soldiers led the channelling of 
existing resources within the ADRP fi rst and foremost towards their assistance. Other 
war-affected people would receive assistance under broader, national programmes, such 
as the poverty-reduction strategy. Still, as the ADRP recognises the need to guarantee 
that reconciliation at the local level is not jeopardised by the focused support to ex-
combatants, a social component was built into the programme. The social reintegration 
strategy includes sensitising local communities to the return of demobilised soldiers and 
vice versa, raising the ex-combatants’ awareness of their civic rights and responsibilities, 
and inform them about health related issues, including HIV/Aids. But such activities 
have usually taken place during the demobilisation phase and are not really sustained 
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throughout the reintegration process in local communities, when they are most needed. 
The economic aspects of reintegration dominate. 
Such an exclusive support to ex-combatants, however limited and brief, creates an 
imbalance in a society that as a whole is recovering from war, and where most people – on 
average in Angola 68 per cent of the population – live below the poverty line, and even 26 
per cent live in extreme poverty.23 Villagers’ reactions vary: ‘I don’t like the demobilised. 
They killed my children. The wound heals but the scars stay forever. When you look 
at the scars again, you know that someone has hurt you. It is as they say: you can clean 
your face but to clean your heart is more diffi cult.’24 ‘The support to the demobilised is 
justifi ed because they are receiving some skills to restart life. But it is important that they 
know that the rest of the people have the same diffi culties as the demobilised. Everyone 
here is restarting life and if these rights only go to the demobilised, it leaves us thinking 
that they are being paid for having made war.’25 ‘The demobilised is receiving his share. 
It is important that they are not thinking of war any longer. But we, as Angolans that 
suffered in the war, also have our rights, although we never picked up the arms.’26
Both villagers and ex-combatants speak of reconciliation as ‘forgiveness’ and ‘to live well 
with others’. ‘Reconciliation is to forget the war and to forgive the brothers that went 
with UNITA.’27 ‘Reconciliation is forgiveness, that a person can be the way he wants 
and that nobody accuses him of past crimes.’28
Conclusions: Angola’s lessons for 
the Great Lakes Region
With most of post-war population movement now complete, Angola is at crossroads. 
Decisions made today will determine whether the huge population of recently displaced 
and former combatants can fully reintegrate into a peacetime society. This is especially 
so because reintegration assistance became so intimately linked to a wider, long-
awaited process of national reconciliation, in which ‘justice-doing’ is directed at durable 
livelihoods and social inclusion. Reintegration was formulated to be a ‘transformational’ 
process linked to pronounced development goals, rather than ‘transitional’ reintegration 
of ex-combatants into civilian life. 
Yet, reintegration assistance in the form of a national version of the regionally designed 
MDRP did not encompass these features in practice. Although the demobilisation 
process commenced immediately after the signing of the April 2002 Memorandum 
of Understanding, a comprehensive reintegration strategy was delayed, which was 
mainly due to tough conditions imposed by donors and an apparent lack of institutional 
capacity on the government’s side. Simultaneously, the reintegration policy increasingly 
narrowed its target group and benefi ts, exhausting local organisation that implemented 
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the programme at grassroots level. Such an approach jeopardises the opportunity a 
reintegration process represents for achieving political stability and building peace. 
In addition, the lack of involvement of local governments as coordinating and 
supervising agencies on the local level where people are rebuilding their lives, and 
the emphasis on economic reintegration in an environment of extreme poverty and 
social exclusion, proved to be particularly problematic, increasing the latent potential 
for recurring confl ict. This ties into the problem that quick-fi x reintegration strategies 
are diffi cult to reconcile with the need for rebuilding social cohesion, and healing. A 
contextualised approach, which keeps a strong eye on the wider political landscape, 
and local particularities including experiences and perceptions, would greatly benefi t 
reintegration strategies, not just in Angola but also in the DRC and elsewhere in the 
greater Great Lakes Region. Although confl icts might have taken a regional or trans-
regional character, reintegration and rebuilding may still take place on a local scale, 
among a variety of actors in specifi c contexts. The legitimacy of a transitional justice 
process is an important, and often underscored, determinant of its outcome. A fi tting 
conclusion should be this quote from one of the people who fl ed his family because of 
war: ‘If there is an area where the bees once stung, and you want go back there, you have 
to take it slow, you have to go carefully.’29
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1 Declaração do Governo da Repu blica de Angola, Governo 
instrui Estado Maior General das Força s Armadas 
Angolanas para cessar movimentos ofensivos, 13 de Março 
de 2002.
2 República de Angola, Lei 1/98 de 20 de Janeiro.
3 Lusaka Protocol, annex 6, agenda item ii4, general 
principles, paragraph 5.
4 Interview with Eunice Inácio, coordinator of 
a peace-building programme at Development 
Workshop, Luanda, October 2005. 
5 Currently, nine countries in Central and Southern 
Africa receive support under the MDRP: Burundi, 
Rwanda, the DRC, Congo Brazzaville, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, Angola, Central African Republic and 
Uganda. (World Bank 2002a). 
6 For an overview of Angola’s disarmament and 
demobilisation process, and early reintegration 
efforts, see Gomes Porto and Parsons 2003.
7 Comissão Intersectorial para o Processo de Paz e 
Reconciliação Nacional (Comite Executivo), Programa de 
Reintegração Social dos Desmobilizados dos Ex-Militares 
da UNITA, Abril 2002.
8 During the Bicesse peace process, 134 289 troops 
were demobilised (10 402 of UNITA’s army FMU 
and 123 887 of the government’s FAPLA). After the 
signing of the Lusaka Protocol 57 111 combatants 
were demobilised (48 700 of FMU and 360 of the 
FAA) (IRSEM 2005).
9 Decreto Presidential 5/02, Regulamento da Comissão 
Nacional de Reintegração Social e Productiva dos 
Desmobilizados e Deslocados.
10 Interview with Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e 
Ambiente (ADRA), Caluquembe, 4 October 2006.
11 Decreto-Lei 17/99 de 29 de Outubro / Orgânica dos 
Governos Provinciais, Administrações Municipais e 
Comunais.
12 Decentralised departments of the ministries of 
Finance, Interior and Justice hardly exist below 
the provincial level, while these services are 
important for citizenship reinforcement and local 
tax collection (UNDP 2005:21, 41-43).
13 This case study is part of a larger, ongoing 
ethnographic research on Angola’s political transition, 
supported by the Wenner Gren Foundation and the 
Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of 
Tropical Research (WOTRO).
14 Interviews with villagers, Caluquembe, October–
November 2006.
15 Interview with 46 year old man from Vatuco 
comuna who fl ed with his family to Quipungo 
– 1993–2002.
16 Interview with 59 year old man from Lomba 
comuna who fl ed with his family to Cacula and 
Lubango – 1995–2002.
17 Interviews with demobilised UNITA soldiers, 
Caluquembe, October–November 2006.
18 Interview with 39 year old demobilised UNITA 
soldier, Ngola comuna.
19 Interview with 40 year old demobilised UNITA 
soldier from Lomopa comuna.
20 Ibid.
21 Interview with 39 year old demobilised UNITA 
soldier from Ngola comuna.
22 World Bank 2006.
23 Governo de Angola, Ministério do Planeamento 2005.
24 Interview with 58 year old woman from Lomba 
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comuna who lost her two children who were 
fi ghting on the government side.
25 Interview with 59 year old man from Vissapa Yela 
comuna who twice fl ed to the centre of Caluquembe 
(1987 and 1992).
26 Interview with 58 year old man from Vatuco comuna 
who fl ed to Malipi, Quipungo, in 1993 until 2002.
27 Ibid.
28 Interview with 33 year old demobilised UNITA 
soldier from Calepi comuna.
29 Interview with 46 year old man from Vatuco 
comuna who fl ed with his family to Quipungo in 
1993 until 2002.
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